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s something of an outsider to this group, I am going to take the liberty of
offering you a story from my “tribe,” which is made up of historians and 
sociologists of the history of science and technology. One of the big questions 
in this tribe has to do with the relation between scientific knowledge and the 
culture that creates it. As we learn more about the actual circumstances that 
led to past scientific innovations, we become aware of the larger than expected 
role of serendipity, luck and ambiguity. Scientists increasingly look like archi-
tects of truth rather than mere discoverers and collectors of facts. And if this is 
an accurate portrayal of what scientists are, then one might reasonably expect 
that different cultures develop different ways of solving scientific and technical 
problems and, in some cases, might disagree with other cultures about which 
facts are real and which are spurious.
In our graduate program at MIT, we have a number of students working 
on some variation of this problem. One of them, Slava Gerovitch from the 
former Soviet Union, is studying the differences in the ways Russians and 
Americans have defined the field of artificial intelligence. He has found that 
although both Russian and American scientists “based their AI (artificial in-
telligence) models on their understanding of the process of human thinking, 
taking it as something homogenous, ahistorical and natural, the “humans” that 
they took as universal categories were, in fact, people who belonged to specific 
cultures.” Thus, Americans and Russians approached problem-solving differ-
ently, and so understood the world in fundamentally different ways. And, 
most importantly, their models of intelligence were different.
Slava offered several examples. In America, predictability and causality 
are treated as social norms: when you go into a restaurant, you typically do 
what the waiter expects and the waiter typically does what you expect, as if you 
are both following a script. This predictability is also built into computers (it 
is called causal chaining inference rules) and people’s expectations of causality 
are met in a culturally identifiable way. For Russians, on the other hand, it is 
difficult to follow such a script, or even to describe “normal” life. They are 
more inclined to describe life in terms of risks and unexpected emergencies. 
As Slava describes it, “people have to take risks because the environment is 
irregular, but it is irregular precisely because everyone is taking risks. Under 
these circumstances, any planning is impossible.” Slava points out that, for 
an American in Russia, making an appointment to see someone only slightly
improves one’s chances of actually having such a meeting, rendering the ubiq-
uitous American appointment book rather useless. Thus, where models of in-
telligence in the U.S. tend to be roughly linear, in Russia they tend to be roughly 
branching. Slava’s other example of different problem-solving techniques fo-
cuses on the notion of choice. Americans are inured to the reality of making 
hundreds of choices every day from millions of options (grocery shelves, mul-
tiple-choice exams, quadraplex movie theaters, menus, department stores, 
etc.). But for Russians who go shopping, “the problem was not how to choose, 
but how to find anything at all.” Indeed, where Americans view choice as a sa-
cred right, Russians refer to choice as a burden. Where “Americans are accus-
tomed to have such a wide range of alternatives that it is commonly perceived 
as a complete set of all possibilities, the main problem is merely to make the 
right choice.” Russians “deal mostly with a narrow spectrum of alternatives 
and usually perceive it as inherently incomplete. They feel it necessary to widen 
the spectrum, to create a new, yet unknown, solution.” I came upon an ex-
ample of this very thing recently when reading about Americans who advised 
the Soviets on collectivization in 1929. Mordecai Ezekiel, a young farm econo-
mist in the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), described efforts to teach 
Russian peasants how to thresh soybeans using a combine. He wrote, “One of 
the American specialists suggested how to set the teeth in the cylinder and ad-
just the speeds to do the job properly. Later he found the machine set as had 
seemed right to the workers, running full blast and churning the beans into an 
excellent imitation of soybean-oil butter. Again the workers announced proudly 
that they had discovered something. No one had ever had the idea of thresh-
ing beans with a combine—they were the first on earth to try it. The engineer’s 
statements that it had been done for twenty years in America and could be done 
with the same combine far better than they were doing it, fell on deaf ears. The 
Russians thought they had discovered something new under the sun—and both 
the joy and the arrogance of discovery was theirs.” Returning to AI modeling, 
then, while the Russian would be more comfortable with models that empha-
size creative solutions to emergencies, the Americans would prefer a predict-
able sequencing of events. Neither model would be natural or universal to the 
other.
While Slava’s notions of scientific thinking may seem far afield from bio-
technology, I would like to suggest that these ideas of predictability and choice 
can help us think more critically about biotechnology, and particularly about 
its historical context. As a historian observing the emergence of agricultural 
biotechnologies, I have been struck by the way in which the discourse regard-
ing the meaning of each new innovation is generally ahistorical; that is, both 
researchers and critics seem unaware of the scientific, technical and social pre-
cedents for the innovation. The particular characteristics of each innovation— 
hybrid corn’s high yield, bovine somatotropin’s (bST) increased production of 
milk, Flavr Savr’s™ longer shelf-life—are emphasized, while its institutional 
and political relationship to earlier innovations is ignored. I do not mean to
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suggest that all such innovations were dreamed up by the same company or 
university, or that they are directly linked in any way. Rather, my point is that 
they all represent a generally singular pattern of relationships between federal 
research laboratories, corporate sponsors, individual scientists, regulatory 
agencies, universities and the public. Further, these relationships are histori-
cally grounded in institutional developments, so that scientific products are 
functionally quite similar despite their wildly different characteristics. While 
Flavr Savr™ tomatoes and hybrid corn might seem totally unrelated, they were 
both made possible, and some might say predictable, by virtue of the negotia-
tions and collaborative arrangements that were set up with the Hatch Act of 
1887 and the Adams Act of 1906—acts that defined the public good not in a 
misty-eyed, Jeffersonian America but in a steely-eyed, Gilded Age America.
While time does not permit a full-scale discussion of these arrangements,
I would like to highlight the way in which such institutional deals served to 
push agriculturalists to model themselves on nonagricultural areas of science 
and engineering with the result that agriculture now finds itself stuck between 
the Scylla of the public and the Charibdys of the research establishment. As a 
way of illustrating this trend, I will consider how public and private choices in 
agriculture have been increasingly reduced over the years, despite the general 
feeling that we have an overabundance of choices. To do this, we will venture 
beyond the sphere of biotechnology per se because the historical precedents 
come from some surprising directions.
Looking at the trajectory of scientific and technological developments 
over the last hundred years, one is immediately struck by the trend towards 
making nature more rational, simple, tractable and more amenable to human 
control and understanding. In the life sciences this has been called “reduction- 
ism” and refers to the fact that since the turn of the century and the rediscovery 
of Mendel’s laws, biologists have been inclined to study ever smaller incre-
ments of life and to extrapolate their findings to larger forms of life. One par-
ticularly striking example of this was the idea, developed in the first decade of 
this century, that if genes were responsible for the inheritance of such things as 
eye color and stature in humans, then they must also be responsible for the 
inheritance of other human traits such as alcoholism, lewdness, atheism or 
simple idiocy. The eugenists, as scientists who believed this were called, also 
believed that more promising characteristics were likewise inherited, such as 
high intelligence, kindness and good health. This was an attractive philoso-
phy to those well-bred members of the scientific community who were un-
certain how to manage the growing immigrant population, urban overcrowd-
ing and the increasing tendency of some to challenge the elite and its privileges. 
And eugenics was attractive because it promised a course of action, a capability 
for change, as had all successful scientific paradigms. If social and psychologi-
cal characteristics were heritable, the logic went, then people with good char-
acteristics should have lots of children and people with bad characteristics 
should not. By the early 1920s many states had passed laws allowing mental
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institutions to sterilize adolescents exhibiting such traits as feeblemindedness, 
epilepsy and promiscuity.
This reductionist approach was also operative in the drive to create hybrid 
corn in the 1920s. As the first biotechnological artifact, hybrid corn seemed 
to promise a much simplified commodity, a plant that had predictable and 
uniform features, that would harbor no nasty surprises, and that would look 
and act the same anywhere, anytime it was planted. The notion that Mende- 
lian genetics led to all kinds of new corn plants hid the fact that, in their effort 
to create specialized plants that fit a niche for, say, short seasons or deep roots, 
scientists reduced both the strains available and the features of each strain. But 
the reductionism was not merely biological. Institutionally, USDA-sponsored 
institutions quit funding research on open-pollinated plants by the mid-1920s, 
confident that hybrids were the wave of the future and that maintaining and 
crossing open-pollinates would be a waste of time. By 1940, seed companies 
like Funk Brothers did not even offer open-pollinates for sale. While we are all 
aware of the genetic difficulties this caused in later years, I want to emphasize 
that the reduction of research capabilities through funding cuts, organiza-
tional changes and institutional realignments had just as tragic an effect. The 
pattern was established where new discoveries yield not an increased number 
of options for researchers, but a decreased number of options because the 
new replaced, rather than joined, the old.
While these new scientific forms grew out of the new Mendelian predic-
tive capabilities, they also reflected broader trends in agricultural thinking. 
With the end of World War I, agricultural markets for American farm prod-
ucts closed with a bang. The ensuing farm depression was the most severe on 
record. With farm costs high, prices low and a flood of products on the mar-
ket, thousands of farmers lost their farms and lots of banks and insurance com-
panies found themselves owners of farms. Agricultural leaders such as Henry 
A. Wallace were perplexed: how to stabilize agriculture, how to guarantee 
farmers a fair profit, how to control the amount of corn or wheat or hogs farm-
ers produced each year? For urban leaders, however, the answer was clear— 
make farming industrial. In their minds, there was nothing inherently rational 
or orderly about manufacturing either; however, J. J. Hill and Henry Ford and 
Thomas Edison had made it rational. The same should be done for farming, 
the last great romantic form of production.
The move towards large-scale farming in the 1920s was born of this be-
lief that simplicity, rationality and standardization were proper ideals for ag-
riculture, and that the manufacturing arena was a proper model. In manufac-
turing, this trend was fairly recent and involved replacing craft production 
with machine production. For example, before the 1910s most of the metal 
trades were still dominated by highly skilled craftsmen who fashioned each 
part on a piece by piece basis, hired and fired their own assistants, owned their 
own tools, followed their own work rules and kept their own hours, which of-
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ten seemed anarchic to factory managers. When corporate observers were ad-
miring Henry Ford’s Highland Park assembly line in 1915, they were impressed 
not only with the number of cars Ford could produce, but with the way Ford 
had all but eliminated skilled and unionized workers from his shop, replacing 
them with unskilled immigrants and skilled machines.
While to us the differences between agriculture and manufacturing appear 
rather obvious, they were seen as challenges to be overcome by enthusiastic ur-
banites such as John D. Rockefeller and J. P. Morgan who financed some of the 
largest experiments in industrial farming. Weather was a real problem, but 
farmers need not just accept Nature’s variations and impediments which, with 
a little ingenuity, could be made less troublesome. Just as Ford had economized 
by making only one kind of car, farmers could grow just one crop, such as 
wheat or oranges. Rather than worry about lack of rainfall in the West, farmers 
should consider changing Nature itself with massive irrigation projects. Rather 
than settling for Nature’s parsimonious arrangement of fields, farmers could 
fill ditches, cut trees, flatten hillsides and join fields together to make a smoother 
tableland on which to operate big combines. Rather than relying on unreliable 
laborers, farmers should invest in such machinery. And, of course, farmers 
who were not very skilled in this new agriculture should consider some other 
line of work.
So-called corporate farms sprang up all over the place. Some were charac-
terized by their vastness such as Thomas Campbell’s 95,000 acre wheat ranch 
in Montana. Campbell had been trained as an engineer, not as a farmer, and 
produced wheat much as Henry Ford produced cars. He installed time clocks 
on his tractors and ran machinery three shifts a day around the clock. He was 
the model of the new agriculture, a hardheaded businessman who believed that 
farming was a productive enterprise, not a romantic way of life. Other examples 
of corporate farms included a livestock farm in Texas that boasted four towns, 
churches, a hospital, schools, roads, electricity and running water in workers’ 
houses—in short, everything a skilled industrial worker could want. Other 
examples were a mint farm in Michigan, a turkey farm in California, wheat 
farms in Kansas, and so on.
One of the reasons for this sudden interest in industrialized farming had 
to do with the role of banks and insurance companies, which found themselves 
owning farms but not really knowing what to do with them. Desperate to im-
prove these farms for resale, many such institutions hit upon the idea of hiring 
agricultural extension agents from the colleges and setting them up as farm 
managers. Such agents found that they could manage ten or twenty farms if 
they could simplify and rationalize operations across the board. It was simply 
too much work to treat each farm as an isolated and intrinsically unique entity; 
if they could be thought of as units of one big farm organization, or if their 
needs could be made similar to each other, then the job of managing them was 
much easier. Within a few years the field of farm management was created as 
a subset of farm economics.
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Coming back to Slava’s discussion of choice and his notion of the “bur-
den of choice,” one can understand how the variation and choice of a farmer’s 
field and home became a bank’s “burden of choice,” and why an institution 
might wish to radically reduce the variations and choices a client might have. 
This has long been a country bank’s prerogative. In Montana, for example, the 
agricultural experiment station designed a scorecard for bankers to use when 
deciding whether to loan money to farmers in 1930. Linking risk with moder-
nity, bankers were encouraged to loan money to farmers who had expanded 
their acreage, purchased new machinery, electrified their homes and practiced 
monoculture. In such a scenario, farmers were not troubled with too many 
choices. If history is any indicator, bankers in dairy states will have a modern 
version of this scorecard very soon.
Those of you who spend your time thinking about the future of agricul-
tural science and technology, then, should beware the seduction of thinking 
that we, as citizens, are awash in choices. Selecting a plain old tube of tooth-
paste at the drugstore can be a paralyzing and stupefying experience thanks to 
the ridiculous number of options. But these are trivial options and their ab-
sence would not represent anything very important. We need to be concerned 
about the actually important options, the fruitful relationships that have forged 
between citizen groups, federal researchers and policymakers, scholars and 
donors, and so on. We need to be certain to keep old strategies available, for 
example, to students who will think of new applications for them, or for cor-
porate sponsors who get bloodied on the cutting edge. We need to be careful to 
keep old solutions, as well as old problems, available, to recognize creativity 
both at the lab bench and in the field, and to reward innovation, both mate-
rial and magical.
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